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Abstract
Twisted Reed–Solomon (TRS) codes are a family of codes that contains a large
number of maximum distance separable codes that are non-equivalent to Reed–Solomon
codes. TRS codes were recently proposed as an alternative to Goppa codes for the
McEliece code-based cryptosystem, resulting in a potential reduction of key sizes. The
use of TRS codes in the McEliece cryptosystem has been motivated by the fact that a
large subfamily of TRS codes is resilient to a direct use of known algebraic key-recovery
methods.
In this paper, an efficient key-recovery attack on the TRS variant that was used
in the McEliece cryptosystem is presented. The algorithm exploits a new approach
based on recovering the structure of a well-chosen subfield subcode of the public code.
It is proved that the attack always succeeds and breaks the system for all practical
parameters in O(n4) field operations. A software implementation of the algorithm
retrieves a valid private key from the public key within a few minutes, for parameters
claiming a security level of 128 bits. The success of the attack also indicates that,
contrary to common beliefs, subfield subcodes of the public code need to be precisely
analyzed when proposing a McEliece-type code-based cryptosystem. Finally, the paper
discusses an attempt to repair the scheme and a modification of the attack aiming at
Gabidulin–Paramonov–Tretjakov cryptosystems based on twisted Gabidulin codes.
1 Introduction
In the last years, cryptosystems relying on the hardness of decoding in a generic code
have gained a lot of attention due to their potential resistance against quantum com-
puter attacks. The first code-based cryptosystem was proposed by McEliece already in
1978 [McE78]. Its hardness is based on the assumption that a random generator matrix of
a random binary Goppa code is hard to distinguish from the generator matrix of a random
code. To this day, the principle behind the McEliece system still plays a significant role in
the design of code-based cryptography. In particular, four out of the six code-based propos-
als in round 2 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) post-quantum
cryptography standardization process are based on McEliece’s principle.
Compared to other post-quantum-secure public-key encryption schemes, e.g. some
lattice-based cryptosystems, the main drawback of the McEliece cryptosystem lies in the
size of its public key. To overcome this drawback, other families of codes have been pro-
posed to replace Goppa codes, but most of them can be subjected to algebraic attacks.
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For instance, generalized Reed–Solomon (GRS) codes were proposed in 1986 by Nieder-
reiter [Nie86], but Sidelnikov and Shestakov mounted a very efficient attack to recover
an alternative secret key [SS92]. Wieschebrink proved that also random subcodes of GRS
codes — proposed in [BL05] — cannot be used due to their vulnerability to the code squar-
ing attack [Wie10]. Further instances and cryptanalyses of algebraic code-based schemes
can be found in [Sid94,MS07, BCGO09, FOP+16, JM96, CCP17]. One should emphasize
that many recent attacks are largely based on previously known methods. For example,
some instances of the RLCE scheme [Wan16] were broken by Couvreur, Lequesne and
Tillich by a sophisticated analysis of the squares of puncturings and shortenings of the
public code [CLT19].
One recent alternative class of codes for the McEliece cryptosystem emerged from
twisted Reed–Solomon (TRS) codes [BPR17]. In particular, Beelen et al. analyzed the
structural properties of a very specific subfamily of TRS codes [BBPR18]. They proved that
this subfamily is disjoint from the class of GRS codes; thus the attack by Sidelnikov and
Shestakov [SS92] cannot be applied to their system. Further, they showed that shortenings
of these codes up to two positions have maximal Schur square dimension [Puc18], meaning
that the proposed system is impervious to a direct application of the attack presented by
Couvreur et al. in [CGGU+14]. Additionally, the authors gave evidence that their system
is not vulnerable to straight-forward applications of methods introduced by Wieschebrink
in [Wie06,Wie10].
The intention of the authors of [BBPR18] was to exploit the optimal error-correction
capability of TRS codes to reduce the length of the public code, and accordingly the size of
the public key. In [BBPR18], an explicit subfamily of TRS codes was proposed, providing
a reduction of the public key up to a factor of 7.4 compared to binary Goppa codes, for a
claimed security level of 128 bits.
In this paper, we present an efficient key-recovery attack on this cryptosystem based on
TRS codes. As analyzed by the authors of [BBPR18], the direct application of previously
known structural attacks does not work. Instead, we recover the structure of a well-
chosen subfield subcode S of the public TRS code T . We give a characterization of the
structure of this subfield subcode, as a subspace of low codimension contained in a classical
Reed–Solomon code R. We then prove that the Wieschebrink squaring method always
succeeds when applied to the subfield subcode S, and this enables us to retrieve an algebraic
description of R. By analyzing equivalent representations of TRS codes, we finally deduce
an algebraic description of the public code T . The application of the squaring method to
the subfield subcode is a non-trivial modification of Wieschebrink’s attack.
To the best of our knowledge, our attack is the first of its kind to exploit structural
weaknesses of subfield subcodes of the public code. On the contrary, the restriction to a
subfield is usually considered as an operation that breaks the structure of an algebraic
code and therefore makes it suitable for cryptography as attested by the attack-resilience
of Goppa codes despite being subfield subcodes of Reed–Solomon codes. Our approach
of attacking the subfield subcode instead of the original code might also be applicable to
other classes of codes used in code-based cryptography.
We show that for all practical parameters proposed by the designers, our algorithm
recovers a valid private key from the public key in O(n4) operations over the underlying
field, where n denotes the code length. The attack is implemented in the computer-
algebra system SageMath [The19] and is made public. Although the implementation is
not optimized, it determines a valid private key in approximately two minutes for the
parameters proposed in [BBPR18].
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notation, and state
the definition as well as important structural properties of TRS codes. In Section 3,
we present the key generation, encryption and decryption algorithm and the parameters
proposed in [BBPR18]. In Section 4, we derive a structural attack on the scheme and we
precisely analyze its complexity. Additionally, in Section 5, we discuss a potential fix of the
cryptosystem, as well as an extension of the attack to the rank metric setting [PRW18].
Conclusions are given in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Let Fq denote the finite field of order q, where q is a prime power. Vectors in Fnq are row
vectors, and we use Fm×nq to represent the set of m×n matrices over Fq. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the (i, j)-th entry of A ∈ Fm×nq is denoted by Ai,j . The set of invertible
matrices of size m over Fq is denoted by GLm(Fq).
Let us fix a finite field extension F/Fq. The F-vector space generated by a subset
S ⊂ Fnq is denoted by SpanF(S). By convention, we also represent the F-vector space
spanned by the rows of A ∈ Fm×nq by SpanF(A).
A linear code C ⊆ Fnq with parameters [n, k, d] is an Fq-vector space of Fnq of dimension
k, where d is the minimum Hamming weight wH(c) := |{i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ci 6= 0}| of a
non-zero codeword c ∈ C. A generator matrix of C is a matrix G ∈ Fk×nq such that
C = SpanFq(G).
Given a ∈ Fnq and b ∈ Fnq , their componentwise product is defined as a ⋆ b :=
(a1b1, . . . , anbn) ∈ Fnq . Further, we define the Schur-square (or Hadamard-square) of a
linear code C ⊆ Fnq as
C(⋆2) := SpanFq ({a ⋆ b : a, b ∈ C}).
Let Fq[X] denote the set of univariate polynomials over Fq. For a fixed evaluation
vector α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Fnq , we define the evaluation map
evα : Fq[X] → Fnq
f 7→ (f(α1), f(α2), . . . , f(αn)).
Finally, if I,J ⊂ N are two finite subsets of integers, then we define their sumset
I + J := {a+ b : a ∈ I, b ∈ J } ⊆ N.
2.2 Twisted Reed–Solomon codes
Before introducing TRS codes, let us first recall the definition of (classical) Reed–Solomon
codes.
Definition 1 (Reed–Solomon code). Let the entries of α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Fnq be pairwise
distinct, and fix 1 ≤ k ≤ n. The Reed–Solomon (RS) code of length n and dimension k is
defined by
RSk,n[α] := {evα(f) : f ∈ Fq[X],deg f ≤ k − 1} ⊆ Fnq .
The entries of α are called locators of the Reed–Solomon code RSk,n[α].
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RS codes are maximum distance separable (MDS) codes, i.e., they reach the Singleton
bound d ≤ n− k+1. They also admit the use of efficient decoding algorithms for an error
of weight up to the unique decoding radius ⌊n−k2 ⌋.
TRS codes were recently constructed as a generalization of RS codes [BPR17]. Let
us first define a specific subspace of polynomials. Let ℓ ≥ 1, and n ≥ k ≥ 1. Given a
vector h ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}ℓ of pairwise distinct increasing hooks, a vector t ∈ {1, . . . , n−k}ℓ
of pairwise distinct twists, and a vector of field coefficients η ∈ (Fq \ {0})ℓ, the set of
[t,h,η]-twisted polynomials is
Pk,n[t,h,η] :=


k−1∑
i=0
fiX
i +
ℓ∑
j=1
ηjfhjX
k−1+tj : fi ∈ Fq

 ⊆ Fq[X].
Definition 2 (Twisted Reed–Solomon code, [BPR17]). Let the entries of α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈
F
n
q be pairwise distinct, and fix 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Let t,h,η be defined as above. The [t,h,η]-
twisted Reed–Solomon (TRS) code of length n, dimension k and locators α is defined
by
TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] := {evα(f) : f ∈ Pk,n[t,h,η]} .
According to Definition 2, a generator matrix of TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] is given by
Gα,t,h,η :=


1
α1
...
αh1−1
αh1 + η1α
k−1+t1
αh1+1
...
αhℓ−1
αhℓ + ηℓα
k−1+tℓ
αhℓ+1
...
αk−1


,
where αi := (αi1, . . . , α
i
n) for i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
In [BBPR18], the authors show that the construction of TRS codes according to Defini-
tion 2 does not necessarily lead to MDS codes. However, they provide a method to obtain
a subfamily of MDS TRS codes, cf. Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Explicit MDS TRS codes [BBPR18]). Let q0 be a prime power, and 1 = s0 <
. . . < sℓ ∈ Z>0 be non-negative integers such that Fqs0
0
⊂ Fqs1
0
⊂ . . . ⊂ Fqsℓ
0
= Fq is a chain
of subfields. Fix k < n ≤ q0 and the entries of α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Fnq0 as pairwise distinct
locators. Finally, let t, h and η be chosen as in Definition 2, such that ηi ∈ Fqsi
0
\ F
q
si−1
0
for i = 1, . . . , ℓ. Then TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] is MDS.
A decoding algorithm for TRS codes is also proposed in [BBPR18]. Given a corrupted
codeword r = c+ e ∈ Fnq , where c ∈ TRSk,n[α, t,h,η], the strategy is to guess ℓ elements
g1, . . . , gℓ ∈ Fq and then to decode r − evα(
∑ℓ
i=1 giηiX
ti+k−1) in the Reed–Solomon code
RSk,n[α]. This approach succeeds if gi = fhi and thus admits a worst case complexity in
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O(qℓn log2 n log log n). Notice that for the explicit family presented in Theorem 1, we have
q = Ω(q2
ℓ
0 ), hence this decoding algorithm is only practical for a tiny number of twists.
The following lemma shows that TRS codes are invariant under specific transformations
of their parameters. This property is a key element for the cryptanalysis of the system,
and could be of independent interest.
Lemma 2. Let α, t, h and η be defined as in Definition 2. Then for any a ∈ Fq \ {0},
TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] = TRSk,n[αˆ, t,h, ηˆ],
where αˆ = aα and ηˆ = (ηˆ1, . . . , ηˆℓ) with ηˆi = ηia
−(k−1+ti−hi), 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
Proof. Let evαˆ(f) ∈ TRSk,n[αˆ, t,h, ηˆ], where f(X) =
∑k−1
i=0 fiX
i +
∑ℓ
j=1 ηˆjfhjX
k−1+tj .
We have
f(aX) =
k−1∑
i=0
(fia
i)Xi +
ℓ∑
j=1
(ηˆja
k−1+tj−hj )(fhja
hj )Xk−1+tj = g(X) ,
where g(X) ∈ Pk,n[t,h,η]. Hence by definition evαˆ(f) ∈ TRSk,n[α, t,h,η], and it follows
that TRSk,n[αˆ, t,h, ηˆ] ⊆ TRSk,n[α, t,h,η]. The proof on the converse inclusion is similar
since a is non-zero.
3 The variant of the McEliece cryptosystem using TRS codes
3.1 Definition of the cryptosystem
Setup. Fix a prime power q0, and integers k < n ≤ q0 − 1 with 2
√
n + 6 < k ≤ n2 − 2.
Also fix ℓ ∈ Z>0 satisfying
n+ 1
k −√n < ℓ+ 2 < min
{
k + 3;
2n
k
;
√
n− 2
}
.
Further, set qi := q2i−1 = q
2i
0 for i = 1, . . . , ℓ, such that Fq0 ⊂ Fq1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Fqℓ = Fq is a
chain of subfields. Finally, set ti = (i+1)(r− 2)− k+2 and hi = r− 1+ i for i = 1, . . . , ℓ,
where r := ⌈n+1ℓ+2 ⌉+ 2.
Integers q0, n, k, ℓ, and tuples t, h satisfying the above conditions are referred to as
valid parameters of the cryptosystem [BBPR18]. They are public parameters.
Key generation. Given valid parameters q0, n, k, ℓ, t and h, a pair of public/private
keys is generated as follows.
1. Choose α ∈ Fnq0 at random such that the entries of α are pairwise distinct.
2. Choose η ∈ Fℓq at random such that ηi ∈ Fqi \ Fqi−1 for i = 1, . . . , ℓ.
3. Choose S ∈ GLk(Fq) at random.
4. Output the public key Gpub = SGα,t,h,η ∈ Fk×nq , where Gα,t,h,η is the generator
matrix of TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] described in Section 2.2.
The private key consists of (S,α,η) and the public key is Gpub.
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Encryption. Given a plaintext m ∈ Fkq and the public key Gpub, the ciphertext is
generated as follows.
1. Choose e ∈ Fnq at random with Hamming weight wH(e) = ⌊n−k2 ⌋.
2. Output the ciphertext
y :=mGpub + e ∈ Fnq .
Decryption. Given a ciphertext y ∈ Fnq and the private key (S,α,η), the decryption
algorithm can be described as follows.
1. Decode y to m˜ =mS ∈ Fkq using the decoding algorithm of TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] given
in [BBPR18].
2. Output the plaintext m = m˜S−1.
Proposed Parameters. The designers of the system proposed the parameters listed in
Table 1 [BBPR18]. Recall that the public code is defined over the field Fq = Fq2ℓ
0
.
q0 n k ℓ t h
256 255 117 1 (57) (88)
Table 1: Parameters proposed in [BBPR18] for a claimed security ≥ 100 bits.
There are two main reasons for choosing a small number of twists. On the one hand, the
complexity of the decoding algorithm proposed in [BBPR18] is in O(qℓ2
ℓ
0 n log
2 n log log n)
and thus increases doubly exponentially with the number of twists. On the other hand,
the number of elements in the largest field Fq also scales exponentially with the number of
twists, which impacts the key sizes.
3.2 Resistance to some known key-recovery algebraic attacks
As mentioned in Section 1, Beelen et al. showed that some existing attacks cannot be
directly mounted on their system [BBPR18]. Let us recall these attacks and explain why
they are ineffective.
Sidelnikov–Shestakov attack. In [SS92], Sidelnikov and Shestakov presented an attack
on a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem using GRS codes. The attack uses two key facts:
first, for MDS codes it is easy to find minimal-weight codewords with a given support, by
running a simple Gaussian elimination; second, the ratio between two minimial-weight
codewords of a GRS code, whose supports differ in only two coordinates, gives a rational
function of degree one. Using these properties, the recovery of an alternate public key (i.e.
an algebraic description of the public code as a GRS code) reduces to solving linear systems
of equations involving the coefficients of the rational functions and the parameters of the
GRS code. Formally, the result of Sidelnikov and Shestakov [SS92] can be summarized as
follows.
Theorem 3 (Sidelnikov–Shestakov [SS92]). Let RSk,n[α] be a Reed–Solomon code with
locators α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Fnq0. Given any generator matrix of RSk,n[α], there exists an
algorithm which determines in time O(n4) a vector α′ ∈ Fnq0 such that
RSk,n[α] = RSk,n[α
′].
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In particular, it holds that α′ = aα+ b1 := (aα1 + b, . . . , aαn + b) with a ∈ Fq0 \ {0} and
b ∈ Fq0.
However for TRS codes, the ratio of two minimal-weight codewords with close support
is a high degree rational function involving many coefficients. This property prevents a
direct use of Sidelnikov–Shestakov’s attack.
Wieschebrink attack. In order to attack a variant of McEliece cryptosystem using ran-
dom subcodes of GRS codes, Wieschebrink considered the following structural properties.
Let C be a random subcode of dimension k −m of a GRS code of dimension k, with m
small compared to k. With high probability, the Schur square C(⋆2) is a GRS code of
dimension min{n, 2k − 1}. If k < n/2, a Sidelnikov–Shestakov attack can be applied to
recover the secret parameters. Otherwise, one can shorten the public code to fulfill the
latter condition, since a shortened RS code is again a RS code.
As proved by the designers of the cryptosystem, Wieschebrink’s idea cannot be directly
applied to TRS codes, due to a smart choice of parameters: the Schur square of the public
code has dimension n, and shortening techniques seem unappropriate since the family of
TRS codes is not stable under this operation. We will see in the following section that
restricting TRS codes to subfields however leaks the algebraic structure of the public code.
4 An efficient key-recovery attack using subfield subcodes
This section presents an efficient key-recovery algorithm for the cryptosystem with the
parameters proposed in [BBPR18]. The algorithm first determines a linear transformation
of the secret locators α by exploiting structural properties of the subfield subcode of the
public code. Then, the algorithm finds the coefficients of the twist monomials by Lagrange
interpolation. The algorithm finally outputs (Sˆ, αˆ, ηˆ) such that SˆGαˆ,t,h,ηˆ = Gpub. As
shown in Lemma 2, (Sˆ, αˆ, ηˆ) is a valid private key that can be used in the decryption
algorithm (see Section 3.1).
4.1 Key-recovery algorithm
4.1.1 First step: recovery of an affine transformation of the secret locators
Let us consider the Fq0-subfield subcode of the code Cpub spanned by the public generator
matrix Gpub. We first state a technical lemma.
Lemma 4. Let the entries of α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Fnq0 be pairwise distinct. Further, let
P ∈ Fq[X] where Fq is an extension of Fq0, such that deg(P ) < n. Then, evα(P ) ∈ Fnq0 if
and only if P ∈ Fq0 [X].
Proof. Let c = evα(P ) and assume that c ∈ Fnq0 . Since α ∈ Fnq0 and n ≤ q0, there
exists a polynomial Q ∈ Fq0 [X] of degree ≤ n such that c = evα(Q). Moreover, evα is
injective over the Fq-subspace of polynomials of degree < q0, hence P = Q. The converse
is straightforward.
Let us now define I := {0, 1, . . . , k− 1} \ {h1, . . . , hℓ} as the set of exponents of mono-
mials which do not support twists1. For valid parameters, I = {0, 1, . . . , r − 1} ∪ {r +
ℓ, . . . , k − 1} since hi = r − 1 + i for each 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. We can now prove the following
characterization of subfield subcodes of TRS codes with valid parameters.
1Since the parameters k and h1, . . . , hℓ are public, an attacker knows the set I.
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Proposition 5. Let TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] be chosen with valid parameters, as described in
Section 3. Define I = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} \ {h1, . . . , hℓ} as above. Then,
TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] ∩ Fnq0 = SpanFq0
({evα(Xi), i ∈ I}
)
.
Proof. Let us denote S = SpanFq0
({evα(Xi), i ∈ I}
)
and Cpub = TRSk,n[α, t,h,η]. First,
it is clear that S ⊆ Cpub ∩ Fnq0 . Indeed, for i ∈ I we have evα(Xi) ∈ Cpub, and since α is a
vector over Fq0 , it yields that evα(X
i) ∈ Fnq0 .
Conversely, let c = evα(f) ∈ Cpub ∩ Fnq0 , where f ∈ Pk,n[t,h,η]. Lemma 4 ensures
that f ∈ Fq0 [X], since deg(f) < n for valid parameters. It remains to notice that Fq0 [X]∩
Pk,n[t,h,η] = SpanFq0 ({X
i, i ∈ I}).
We observe by Proposition 5 that the subfield subcode Csub := TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] ∩ Fnq0
is a proper non-MDS subcode of the RS code RSk,n[α]. Thus, one cannot directly use
a Sidelnikov–Shestakov attack [SS92] on Csub. In 2006, Wieschebrink mounted an attack
on cryptosystems based on random subcodes of RS codes [Wie10]. The author’s idea is
that, with very high probability over the chosen subcode C′, the square code C′(⋆2) is a
RS code. A Sidelnikov–Shestakov attack can then be used on C′(⋆2) to recover the private
parameters.
In the following, we prove that for most valid parameters defined in [BBPR18], and for
all practical ones, the square code C(⋆2)sub is a RS code subject to a Sidelnikov–Shestakov
attack.
Proposition 6. Let q0, n, k, ℓ, t and h be valid parameters, and assume that ℓ ≤ 12(
√
n−
3). Let Csub = TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] ∩ Fnq0. Then,
(Csub)(⋆2) = RS2k−1,n[α].
Proof. We use the notation and the results of Proposition 5. This yields
(Csub)(⋆2) = SpanFq0
({evα(Xi) ⋆ evα(Xj) : (i, j) ∈ I}
)
= SpanFq0
({evα(Xi) : i ∈ I + I}
)
.
As a consequence, the theorem holds if I + I = {0, . . . , 2k − 2}.
Notice that for valid parameters, we have 2k − 1 ≤ n− 3 and I = I1 ∪ I2, where I1 =
{0, . . . , r−1}, I2 = {r+ ℓ, . . . , k−1} and r = ⌈n+1ℓ+2 ⌉+2. We have {0}+I = {0, . . . , r−1},
I1 + I2 = {r+ ℓ, . . . , k + r− 2} and {k− 1}+ I2 = {k+ r+ ℓ− 1, . . . , 2k − 2}, hence it is
clear that I + I contains the subset
{0, . . . , r − 1} ∪ {r + ℓ, . . . , k + r − 2} ∪ {k + r + ℓ− 1, . . . , 2k − 2} .
Moreover one can easily check that if ℓ ≤ r − 1, then {r, . . . , r + ℓ − 1} ⊆ I1 + I1. The
condition ℓ ≤ r− 1 is always satisfied with valid parameters since ℓ < √n− 3 and r > √n.
Finally, the assumption ℓ ≤ 12(
√
n − 3) leads us to ℓ ≤ k−r−12 using constraints on valid
parameters. This easily yields {k + r − 1, . . . , k + r + ℓ− 2} ⊆ I2 + I2.
Remark 7. In practice, the assumption ℓ ≤ 12(
√
n− 3) is not restrictive, since the decryp-
tion algorithm is effective only if ℓ≪ log n.
For valid parameters, we have 2k−1 ≤ n−3, hence we can apply a Sidelnikov–Shestakov
attack to the code C(⋆2)sub ⊆ Fnq0 . This algorithm outputs a vector of locators α′ ∈ Fq0 which
is an affine transformation of the secret locators α (see Theorem 3). Formally, α′ = aα+b1
for some a ∈ Fq0 \ {0} and b ∈ Fq0, where 1 := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Fnq0 .
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4.1.2 Second step: from an affine to a linear transformation of the secret
locators
Lemma 2 only ensures that TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] = TRSk,n[αˆ, t,h, ηˆ] if αˆ = aα for a non-
zero a ∈ Fq0 . Therefore, given α′ = aα + b1, the search of a valid b ∈ Fq0 such that
α′ − b1 = aα remains. Since q0 is rather small, this search can be proceeded exhaustively
as follows. Given α′ and b ∈ Fq0 , one first computes the code
Ab := SpanFq0
({evα′−b1(Xi) : i ∈ I}
)
.
If Ab ⊆ Cpub holds, then we have found a valid b and hence a valid αˆ = α′ − b1. Notice
that each individual test Ab ⊆ Cpub can be performed in time O(n3).
4.1.3 Third step: recovery of a valid pair (αˆ, ηˆ)
The previous steps provide a tuple αˆ ∈ Fnq0 which can be used as a vector of locators for
the public TRS code. In order to determine a vector ηˆ ∈ Fnq such that TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] =
TRSk,n[αˆ, t,h, ηˆ], we use the following result.
Lemma 8. Let 1 ≤ ℓ, and P (X) =∑k−1i=0 uiXi +
∑ℓ
j=1 ηjuhjX
k−1+tj ∈ Pk,n[t,h,η] such
that uhj 6= 0. Denote by pˆhj and pˆk−1+tj the coefficients of the monomials Xhj and Xk−1+tj
in Pˆ (X) = P (a−1X). Then, we have
ηˆj = ηja
−(k−1+tj−hj) =
pˆk−1+tj
ˆphj
.
Proof. This is clear from the following simple computation
Pˆ (X) := P (a−1X) =
k−1∑
i=0
uia
−iXi +
ℓ∑
j=1
ηjuhja
−(k−1+tj)Xk−1+tj .
Hence, a vector of coefficients ηˆ such that TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] = TRSk,n[αˆ, t,h, ηˆ] can be
computed as follows. Pick at random a codeword c = evα(P ) ∈ Cpub = TRSk,n[α, t,h,η].
Then, interpolate c = evαˆ(Pˆ ) as a polynomial evaluated over the vector of locators αˆ.
Notice that we have Pˆ (X) = P (a−1X), thus for every non-zero coefficient uhj of P , we
obtain the coefficient ηˆj due to Lemma 8.
It remains to be observed that, if a codeword c is picked uniformly at random in Cpub,
the probability that uj = 0 is roughly 1/q. Since ℓ≪ q, a random c leads to the recovery
of the whole vector ηˆ with high probability. Note that this procedure can be derandomized
by iteratively taking each row the public matrix Gpub.
4.1.4 Final step: recovery of an alternative private key (Sˆ, αˆ, ηˆ)
After determining αˆ and ηˆ, one can easily compute a matrix Sˆ such that SˆGαˆ,t,h,ηˆ = Gpub.
Then, (Sˆ, αˆ, ηˆ) can be used in the proposed decryption algorithm as a valid (alternative)
private key to retrieve any secret plaintext m.
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Algorithm 1 Key-recovery attack
Input: Gpub
Output: Sˆ, αˆ, ηˆ
Step 1: recovery of some locators
1: Gsub ← SubfieldSubcode(Gpub) ∈ F(k−ℓ)×nq0
2: Gsq ← Square(Gsub) ∈ F(2k−1)×nq0
3: α′ ← SidelShest(Gsq) ∈ Fnq0
Step 2: exhaustive search for b
4: for all b ∈ Fq0 do
5: αˆ← (α′1 − b, . . . , α′n − b) ∈ Fnq0
6: G′ ← GenSub(αˆ) ∈ F(k−ℓ)×nq0
7: if G′(G⊥sub)
⊤ = 0 then
8: break
Step 3: recovery of ηˆ
9: J ← {1, . . . , ℓ}
10: for all row ri of Gpub do
11: P (X)← Interpolate(α′, ri) ∈ Fnq
12: for all j ∈ J do
13: if phj 6= 0 then
14: ηˆj ←
pk−1+tj
phj
∈ Fq
15: J ← J \ {j}
16: if J = ∅ then
17: break
Step 4: recovery of Sˆ
18: GˆTRS ← GTRS(αˆ, ηˆ) ∈ Fk×nq
19: Sˆ ← GˆTRS\Gpub ∈ Fk×kq
20: return Sˆ, αˆ, ηˆ
4.2 Analysis of the attack
A summary of the attack is given in Algorithm 1. Let us explain the notation we use
there. Given a matrix A ∈ Fk×nq , its transpose is represented by A⊤, and A⊥ is a matrix
whose rows form a basis of the right kernel of A. The reduced row echelon form of A is
denoted by rref(A). Moreover, if A ∈ Fk×nq and B ∈ Fk×nq have the same rowspace, then
D = A\B denotes any solution to DA = B. Finally, in Table 2 we describe functions
involved in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 9. Given any generator matrix Gpub of a TRS code Cpub = TRSk,n[α, t,h,η] ⊆
F
n
q , Algorithm 1 retrieves a tuple (Sˆ, αˆ, ηˆ) such that the matrix SˆGαˆ,t,h,ηˆ generates Cpub
in O(max{q0, 2ℓ, n} · n3) operations over Fq.
Proof. The correctness of Algorithm 1 was proved in Section 4.1. Let us now provide
details about the complexity of Algorithm 1.
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Function Description
SubfieldSubcode maps a generator matrix of Cpub to a generator matrix of the
subfield subcode of Cpub
Square maps a generator matrix of Csub to a generator matrix of the
code C(⋆2)sub
Interpolate maps vectors (a, b) ∈ (Fnq )2 to P (X) of degree < n such that
P (ai) = bi for i = 1, . . . , n
GenSub maps a vector a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Fnq0 to a matrix A ∈
F
(k−ℓ)×n
q0 whose rows are (a
j
1, . . . , a
j
n) for each j ∈ I =
{0, . . . , k − 1} \ {h1, . . . , hℓ}.
SidelShest implements a Sidelnikov–Shestakov attack, which takes a
generator matrix G of a RS code as input, and returns a
vector of locators α′ describing the code
GTRS maps the vectors αˆ and ηˆ to the generator matrix Gαˆ,t,h,ηˆ
of the corresponding TRS code
Table 2: List of functions used in Algorithm 1.
• Line 1: The computation of Gsub ∈ F(k−ℓ)×nq0 requires O(n2(k + n)) ⊆ O(n3) opera-
tions in Fq and O(n2(2ℓ(n − k) + n)) ⊆ O(2ℓn3) operations in Fq0 .
• Line 2: The computation of Gsq ∈ F(2k−1)×nq0 can be performed in time O(n4).
Informally, one needs to find a basis of the space generated by the set {gi,j :=
(Gsub)i ⋆ (Gsub)j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ dimCsub}. This basis can be built iteratively; updating
the basis with a new element costs O(n3) operations in Fq0 and must be done O(n)
times, and rejecting candidates costs O(n2) operations in Fq0 and must be done O(n
2)
times.
• Line 3: Applying the SidelShest function on Gsq ∈ F(2k−1)×nq0 requires O((2k −
2)4 + (2k − 2)n) ⊆ O(n4) operations in Fq0 [SS92].
• Line 4 to Line 8: The computation of αˆ ∈ Fnq0 requires O(n) operations in Fq0 ;
building G′ ∈ F(k−ℓ)×nq0 needs O((k − ℓ)n) operations in Fq0 ; matrix multiplication
G′(G⊥sub)
⊤ needs O((k− ℓ)(n−k+ ℓ)n) ⊆ O(n3) operations in Fq0 (G⊥sub was already
computed in Line 1). In the worst case, the previous sequences of computations have
to be performed q0 times. Hence these steps require O(q0n3) operations in Fq0 .
• Line 10 to Line 17: In the worst case, ℓ · k interpolations have to be performed,
requiring O(ℓkn2) ⊆ O(ℓn3) operations in Fq.
• Line 18: Computation of GˆTRS ∈ Fk×nq needs O(kn) ⊆ O(n2) operations in Fq.
• Line 19: Computation of Sˆ ∈ Fk×kq by a reduction to row echelon form of the matrix(
Gˆ
⊤
TRS G
⊤
pub
)
∈ Fn×2kq needs O(n2(2k)) ⊆ O(n3) operations in Fq.
In practice, ℓ and q0 = q1/2
ℓ
must be chosen to be small (for instance, ℓ = 1 and
q0 = n + 1 = 2
8 were proposed in [BBPR18]) in order to obtain an efficient decryption
algorithm and keys of moderate size. Hence, for practical parameters Algorithm 1 has a
complexity in O(n4) and thus recovers a valid private key in polynomial time.
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q0 n k ℓ wH(e)
Claimed
security level
Runtime of
Algorithm 1
28 255 117 1 83 128 bits 133 seconds
28 255 117 2 83 128 bits 141 seconds
29 511 200 3 192 196 bits 2260 seconds
29 511 170 3 217 256 bits 1532 seconds
Table 3: Experimental results obtained by averaging several runtimes of Algorithm 1 on an
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7600U CPU @ 2.80GHz. The first row refers to parameters proposed
by the designers of the system. Remaining security levels were computed according to
formulae given in [BBPR18].
Our attack is implemented in the computer algebra system SageMath v8.7 [The19]
and is available at https://bitbucket.org/julianrenner/trs_attack. Although the
implementation is not optimized, it recovers a valid private key within a few minutes for
the proposed parameters, see Table 3.
5 Discussion and open questions
5.1 Repairing the cryptosystem?
After a notification of this attack, the authors of [BBPR18] described a possible fix of the
system, in which a modified version of the generator matrix is made public. The idea is
to multiply the generator matrix Gpub from the right by a diagonal matrix with non-zero
entries y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ (Fq \ {0})n, such that the Fq0-subfield subcode of the vector
space spanned by the rows of Gpub is not contained in a RS code. This clearly prevents a
direct application of our attack.
Nevertheless, we would like to point out that this possible repair might not fix the
inherent weaknesses of the cryptosystem. In fact, the subfield subcode of a GRS code
y⋆RSk,n[α] is a so-called alternant code Altk′,n[α,y] ⊆ Fnq0 , which also admits an algebraic
description. As a consequence, it seems very plausible that the security of the proposed
repaired cryptosystem can be reduced to the security of a McEliece-like cryptosystem using
the subfield subcode Altk′,n[α,y].
One can then notice that the parameters proposed by the authors of [BBPR18] are far
below those considered as secure for alternant codes. For instance, BIG QUAKE [BBB+17]
and Classic McEliece [Dan17] (both are unbroken candidates for the NIST standardization
call on post-quantum cryptography) use alternant codes with a length and dimension of
several thousands, while in the proposed parameters for the TRS codes, we have n = 255
and k = 117 with a field size q0 = 28. Algebraic attacks as developed in [FOPT10,FOP+16]
should then be considered as a potential threat. One should also mention the recent attack
on the cryptosystem DAGS [BBB+18] based on alternant codes, performed by Barelli and
Couvreur [BC18]. Informally, the authors of [BC18] manage to derive an alternant code
with much smaller parameters from the public code, allowing the last step of the key
recovery algorithm — which is exponential in the involved parameters — to remain feasible
due to the small size of the derived alternant code.
Finally and most crucially, one can question the possible benefit to consider codes whose
security might not be better than those based on alternant codes (for which cryptosystems
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have been designed and studied), but which suffer from larger key sizes and much less
efficient decoding algorithms.
5.2 On the rank metric version of the cryptosystem
In [PRW18] a modified version of the previous system was proposed, based on a subfamily
of twisted Gabidulin codes. The idea is to consider a variant of the GPT cryptosys-
tem [GPT91], where twisted Gabidulin codes are used instead of (subcodes of) Gabidulin
codes. Although we do not claim to have a proper attack on the system, let us show some
potential weaknesses that could be analyzed in a future work.
The GPT cryptosystem can be viewed as an analogue of the McEliece cryptosystem,
using rank metric codes instead of Hamming metric codes. We refer to [Ove07] for more
details about rank metric codes and variants of the GPT cryptosystem. Let us give a short
overview of the latter.
Let Fp ⊂ Fq and Γ ⊆ {C ⊆ Fn−tq ,dim C = k} be a family of rank metric codes. The
GPT cryptosystem works as follows:
• Key generation: Alice generates a secret generator matrix G ∈ Fn−tq for a code C
randomly chosen in Γ. Then she computes a public key Gpub = S[X|G]P , where
the matrices S ∈ GLk(Fq), X ∈ Fk×tq of rank s ≤ t, and P ∈ GLn(Fp) are chosen
uniformly at random and kept secret.
• Encryption: given a plaintextm ∈ Fkq , Bob computes the ciphertext y =mGpub+e,
where e ∈ Fnq is a random error with small rank over Fp (the rank of the error is such
that e can be decoded in C).
• Decryption: Alice decodes the last n − t coordinates of yP−1 in the code C and
retrieves m.
In most variants of the GPT cryptosystem, Γ is a (sub-)family of Gabidulin codes [Gab85]
Gk,n−t[α] = SpanFq
{
evα(X
[i]), i = 0, . . . , k − 1},
where α ∈ Fn−tq are Fp-linearly independent, andX [i] := Xp
i
. Polynomials with monomials
only of the form X [i] are called p-polynomials, or linearized polynomials. In [PRW18], the
authors proposed to define Γ as the subfamily of twisted Gabidulin codes
Gn−t,k[α, t,h,η] =
{
evα(f) : f ∈
{ k−1∑
i=0
fiX
[i] +
ℓ∑
j=1
ηjfhjX
[k−1+tj ] : fi ∈ Fq
}}
,
where ηi are chosen in the chain of subfields Fq0 ⊂ Fq1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Fqℓ = Fq, and (α1, . . . , αn−t) ∈
F
n−t
q0 are Fp-linearly independent, similar to the case of TRS codes.
Our claim is that the code Cpub generated by Gpub also admits structured subfield
subcodes which could be used to attack the system. Indeed, one can prove that the last
n−t coordinates of (Cpub∩Fnq0)P−1 form a subcode of the Gabidulin code Gk,n−t[α] ⊆ Fn−tq0
of rather small codimension. Applying variants of Overbeck’s attacks — e.g. in [Ove05]
— might lead to the recovery of a linear transformation of α and thus a structural attack
on the public key close to the one presented in this paper.
For a code A ⊆ Fnq and f ≥ 0, let A[1] := {(a[f ]1 , . . . , a[f ]n ),a ∈ A}, and
Λf (A) := A+A[1] + · · ·+A[f ] .
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In fact, we observe in simulations that for f = n−k− t−1, if Λf (Cpub∩Fnq0) has dimension
n− 1, then one recovers an Fp-linear transformation αˆ of α, as well as a full-rank matrix
Pˆ ∈ Fn×np , by applying [Ove07, Algorithm 3.5.1] to a generator matrix of Cpub∩Fnq0. Then,
the coefficients ηˆ are determined by interpolation of the last n− t positions of the rows of
GpubPˆ
−1
with p-polynomials of p-degree smaller than n, similar to Section 4.1.3. Finally,
one chooses Sˆ such that
SˆGˆ =
(
GpubPˆ
−1)
[t+1:n]
,
where subscript [t+1 : n] refers to the last n−t positions of GpubPˆ−1 and Gˆ is a generator
matrix of Gn−t,k[αˆ, t,h, ηˆ]. Clearly, (Sˆ, αˆ, ηˆ, Pˆ ) is then a valid private key.
Further simulations show that if X has full Fq-rank and t is small, then the code
Λf (Cpub ∩ Fnq0) has a dimension n− 1 with high probability. However, if t is large or if X
has Fq-rank smaller than t, then Λf (Cpub ∩Fnq0) has dimension smaller than n− 2 and this
straightforward approach fails.
Since a precise analysis of the potential weakness of system proposed in [PRW18] is
out of the scope of this paper, we leave it as an open problem for future research.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents an efficient key-recovery attack on the McEliece cryptosystem based
on a subfamily of TRS codes. The attack does not contradict the structural properties
presented in [BBPR18], but recovers the structure of a subfield subcode of the public TRS
code, which enables us to determine a description of the supercode. This attack retrieves a
valid private key from the public key for all practical parameters in O(n4) field operations.
This is formally proved, and confirmed by experimental results: one retrieves a valid private
key for a claimed security level of 128 bits within a few minutes. In addition, the security
of the system after an attempt to repair it is discussed, as well as potential ways to adapt
our attack to the rank metric variant of the considered system.
The subfield subcode approach presented in this paper is unique, in the sense that
a widespread idea considers the restriction of codes to subfields as a way to break their
structure. However, our cryptanalysis proves that subfield subcodes — as well as punctured
codes and shortened codes — must also be taken into account when trying to assert the
security of McEliece-like cryptosystems.
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